Makarychev 2004 - Where the North ...

Makarychev 2004 - Where the North Meets the East 1 , Studia, Skandynawistyka

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Where the North Meets the East
Europe’s ‘Dimensionalism’ and Poland’s
‘Marginality Strategy’
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this paper is to analyse Poland’s Eastern Dimension
(ED) proposal as seen from the marginality theoretical background.
The basic argument is that the ED stands out as a discursive battlefield
for different representations of Poland and of Europe’s margins. In
devising its marginality strategy, Poland has learned from Finland about
the ability of a state at the edge of the European Union to have an
impact on the whole. However, Poland is torn between sovereign and
post-sovereign discourses of space and identity; the tensions between
them explain why the ED remains vague.
Keywords:
de-bordering; Eastern Dimension; marginality; Northern
Dimension
There is some logic in the fact that Finland and Poland, two former margins
of the Russian empire, have become two of the most important sources of
regional innovation in Europe, as exemplified in their respective proposals
for a Northern Dimension (ND) and an Eastern Dimension (ED) for the
policies of the European Union (EU). Both initiatives have to be analysed
as parts of ‘new geometries’ of regionalism that link the core powers with
Europe’s margins and that relate to EU enlargement (e.g. ‘the Barcelona
process’, the Barents–Euroarctic project, the Central European Initiative,
to name a few). In this context, the cases of Finland and Poland seem to
confirm the widely discussed idea that margins may also have a certain
power to define the nature of the whole (Parker, 2000: 7).
My intention in this paper is to analyse Poland’s ED proposal in the con-
text of marginality theory as developed by Noel Parker. I argue that the ED
stands out as a discursive battlefield for different representations of Poland
and of Europe’s margins. In devising its marginality strategy, Poland has
learned from Finland about the ability of a state at the edge of the EU to
have an impact on the whole. However, Poland is torn between sovereign
and post-sovereign discourses of space and identity; the tensions between
them explain why the ED remains vague. Poland’s attempts to assert its
‘Westphalianess’ may prevent the ED from adopting the post-sovereign
aspects of the ND.
Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association
Vol. 39(3): 299–315. Copyright ©2004 NISA www.ps.au.dk/NISA
Sage Publications
0010-8367. DOI: 10.1177/0010836704045206
300
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT
39(3)
The article is in four sections. First, I describe the basic concepts of
marginality and ‘dimensionalism’. Second, I turn to the ED as an instru-
ment of Poland’s marginality strategy and take a look at the utility of the
Nordic–Baltic experience for the ED. Third, I discuss factors hindering the
de-bordering effects of the ED. Fourth, I illustrate various other visions of
the ED that can be seen in both Russian and Ukrainian debates. The diver-
gence of opinions regarding the nature of the ED testifies to the extent to
which the ED can be seen to be a constructivist project in the making, its
essence emerging from the battle of ideas that surround it.
Playing on the Margins and Dimensions: Conceptual
Underpinnings
The concepts of marginality and ‘dimensionalism’ focus on the questions
the ED raises for the understanding of political space in general and the
construction of Europe in particular.
Conceptually, peripheries are presented as underdeveloped, incon-
veniently positioned, exposed to external dangers, and subordinated terri-
tories. Alternatively, peripheries are presented as margins, rather
autonomous spaces able, under certain circumstances, to ‘bite back’, i.e. to
use the threat of exit from the orbit of the dominating centres and develop
strategies of their own. Marginality, in Parker’s vision, does not equate with
inferiority; moreover, the post-sovereign era opens up new opportunities
for marginal actors. Thus, countries located at the intersection of different
polities and identities (‘crossroads actors’) are capable of thinking about
how to make better use of their marginality resources through inclusive
cooperation with adjacent territories.
Another useful distinction has to be drawn between the concept of
‘dimension’ and bilateral agreements. ‘Dimension’, as seen from the ND
perspective, can be conceptualized by positing the following assumptions:
•
political space is seen as heterogeneous and self-organized, with a vari-
ety of ‘growth poles’
•
its components are active agents of regional integration, not simply
subjects of someone else’s policies
•
dialogue between different ‘dimensional’ actors facilitates cultural
exchanges and undermines the ‘self/other’ opposition
•
the boundaries of ‘dimensions’ are flexible and do not necessarily over-
lap with administrative borders
•
as an ‘open forum’ model of integration, ‘dimensionalism’ closely cor-
relates with the globalization paradigm.
To some extent, the differences between the ‘dimensions’ and traditional
state-to-state arrangements are reminiscent of the distinction between
‘hard vs. soft regionalism’ (Makarychev, 2002: 36). ‘Hard regionalism’ refers
to top-down, state-centric, hard security-oriented regional cooperation.
Hard regionalism is centralized and elicits a hierarchical pattern of regional
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dynamics focused on control over sovereignty, territory and borders.
Alternatively, the concept of ‘soft regionalism’ has connotations with
‘dimensionalism’ and discourses of post-sovereignty because of its accent
on decentralized, networked regionalism, which leaves ample space for
grass-roots initiatives beyond the ‘administrative market’. Creativity, inspi-
ration and imagination become the guiding principles of ‘soft’ regionalism.
Like ‘dimensionalism’, it draws on a set of shared meanings giving rise to a
sense of belonging. Regions are understood as mobile social constructs that
might encounter, clash, inject their own stories, etc. (Joenniemi and Lehti,
2001: 132).
In this sense, there is always something new in ‘dimensionalism’. ‘The
regionalism of dimensions’ means not only that the EU favours a ‘regional
approach’ towards groups of (non-member) states to (exclusively) bilateral
relations; it allows for different spatial shapes, and thus blurs the distinction
between insiders and outsiders. Identity markers always involve a choice
(what we wish to belong to?), because the social world is defined not just by
physical constraints but also in spiritual and normative categories. In a post-
sovereign way of thinking, there can be no single mode of spatial represen-
tation, and all spatial arrangements can be opposed. Geography cannot
lock up regions in a ‘steel cage’, and geographical affiliations are subject to
re-interpretation (Nekrasas, 1998: 22–3). Region-building begins in the field
of ideas and public debates, and is supposed to convince participants of a
common background by making common values come into force. Table 1
illustrates some of the differences noted above.
The perspectives of ‘dimensionalism’ in Europe are directly related to
EU enlargement, since the increasingly diversified political space spells fur-
ther differentiation. The more complex the EU is becoming intrinsically, the
more space will be needed for regional groupings inside it, with each
increasingly likely to seek more autonomy in making contact with non-EU
members. This potentially emerging structure of European political space
can be metaphorically depicted as promoting an ‘Olympic rings’ vision of
Europe. This can be conceptually contrasted with a more traditional
TABLE 1
Hard Regionalism/State-to-state policies
Soft Regionalism/Dimensionalism
Vertical-based Horizontal
Depends on administrative and/or Relies upon a networking concept
diplomatic levers of integration
Control-focused Influence-focused
Promotes hierarchy and standardization Develops autonomy and variety
Main organizing principles are sovereignty The key marker is de-regulated
and security
regionality
Relations between constituent parts are
Relations are less formal, more
more formal (framework-oriented)
flexible (network-oriented)
Implies sovereign (modern) visions of
Reflects post-sovereign (post-
regionality
modern) territorial arrangements
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COOPERATION AND CONFLICT
39(3)
TABLE 2
‘Concentric rings’ Europe
‘Olympic rings’ Europe
Regions subordinate to Brussels
Regional spaces co-exist with each
other (‘neo-medievalization’
of Europe)
Vertical integration
Horizontal interaction
Distinctive center – periphery divide
Neither a clear center nor a clear
periphery
Regions have a priori different status
Regions are equal in terms of
within single hierarchy
their significance and
importance
Reflects the sovereignty-based concept of
Is part of post-sovereignty
space
conceptualizations
‘concentric rings’ model. The use of binaries such as Europe of concentric
circles/Europe of Olympic rings may make it easier to discuss complex
developments, but of course the reality is more complex than clear-cut dis-
tinctions. However, some of them are shown in Table 2.
In the second section I turn to the ED as seen from the perspectives of
marginality and ‘dimensionalism’. In fact the ED is a ‘battlefield’ with dif-
ferent interpretations of the essence of the initiative, each one making its
own points regarding the direction(s) in which the policy should develop.
The ED is a matter of political debate both within Poland and internation-
ally, which means that certain justifications push it in a modern,
sovereignty-related direction, while others move it towards a more post-
sovereign destination. There is potential tension in the fact that Poland has
become an independent nation-state at a time when such modern con-
structions are increasingly perceived as running against ‘history’. Poland
may opt for adoption of a post-sovereign agenda or adhere to modernist
reactionism.
Poland’s Marginality Strategy: Softening East–West Division(s)
The political space of ‘Eastern Europe’, being a part of the Cold War legacy,
has almost disappeared as one of the basic markers of European political
space. The countries of what was formerly called ‘Eastern Europe’ have had
to find new identifications, thus fuelling debates about new ‘coordinates’ in
Europe.
The ED idea was initially proclaimed in 1998 and further elaborated by an
international team of experts known as the Villa Faber Group, which stated
that the ED should be modelled according to the ND and should become the
main instrument for implementing ‘the strategy of controlled permeability
of the accession countries’ eastern borders’ (Thinking Enlarged, 2001:
10–27). However, Poland’s officials themselves are vague in describing
MAKARYCHEV
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303
exactly what the ED is — it has thus been presented rather opaquely as an
‘umbrella’, ‘framework’, or ‘addition to the ND’ (Cimoszewic, 2003). The
variety of the terms leaves the principal questions open: whether the ED is
an effort undertaken by Poland to make use of the options embedded in the
phenomenon of marginality, and whether there is something in Poland’s
approach that tends to limit the ED scope.The question of how faithful to the
ND its Eastern analogue should be is also debatable.
Studying the Finnish Lessons
The ND, which serves as a reference point for the ED, is a good illustration
of the feasibility of ‘dimensionalist’ and post-territorial approaches to
European political space, because it highlights the changing meaning of
borders in Europe. The ND regionalism first started as a concept positing
that borders should no longer be perceived in a traditional sense, since they
are not simply concerned with the delineation of sovereignties. Instead,
they form a more complex set of issues that are only partially moulded by
states.
The ND contributes to turning the EU into a multi-level regional entity
that encompasses a variety of centre-margin dynamics and cross-border
relations, and that can be conceptualized as post-sovereign through the
emphasis that is placed on border-breaking elements of cultural identities,
economic flows, trans-national exchanges, soft security solutions, and so on.
It is appreciated in Poland that the ND has become a mediator of different
historical and cultural worlds and thus has opened up new channels of
inclusive dialogue with non-members of the EU.
One of the most convincing ‘Finnish lessons’ for Poland is that ‘a small
and relatively peripheral country appears to have grasped the initiative’ of
doing away with the old opposition between ‘East’ and ‘West’ as the core
European signifiers (Joenniemi, 1999: 5). Like Poland, in the 1990s Finland
was not eager to associate with Eastern Europe, which had become too
uncertain and had lost its political identity. Neither did Finland want to
accept the hegemony of the EU. That is why the ND is at odds with endeav-
ours to maintain a rather centralized and hierarchic EU, and makes Europe
more multilayered, pluralistic, less coherent and centrally controlled.
Making the ND Heritage Work
Poland has been impressed by Finland’s success and appears keen to repro-
duce it in its own space. The very fact that the ED was born at the cross-
roads of different regional spaces contains some de-bordering potential,
since Poland is able to accumulate regional experiences and influence the
moulding of several regions: Western, Central and Eastern Europe, as well
as the Baltic area. Thus, Poland may potentially emerge as an intermediary
in East–West political communication. Poland’s vision of its mission could
be conceptualized in terms of an ‘extended East and Central European
region’ that will play the role of a ‘good neighbourhood’ belt (Stanczyk,
2002: 114).
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